We describe the broad range of uncertainties faced by the developers of medical technologies. Empirically, we estimate the asset market incidence of two realizations of uncertainties we classify as within-market policy risks. The events we analyze concern the intellectual property of Myriad Genetics, Inc., an American molecular diagnostics firm. In June 2013, the Supreme Court invalidated several of Myriad's intellectual property claims. Subsequently, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) re-evaluated the reimbursements it pays for the services at issue in the Supreme Court's ruling. Each of these events moved Myriad's market capitalization by several hundred million dollars, or on the order of 20 percent. Myriad's exposure to the realization of these events reflected the concentration of its revenue streams among the affected services. We discuss the implications of the risks we analyze for the total volume of medical innovation and for its organization across firms. 
I Introduction
Risk and expected returns shape the aggregate volume and organization of innovative activity. While the theory underlying these linkages has received ample attention, cataloging and quantifying the risks relevant in any particular industry requires attention to institutional detail and empirical documentation. In this paper, we consider the relevance of risks we term "within-market policy risks" for the returns to the development of medical technology.
In Section 2, we organize the risks faced by medical innovators into a typology. First among our typology's broad categories are pre-market risks. This category, which has been widely studied, includes standard risks associated with product development and regulatory approval. Our second broad category encompasses within-market economic risks. These risks, also widely studied, include input cost variability, the introduction of competing products and, more broadly, threats to a product's demand. A third category involves what we call within-market policy risks. This category includes risks such as patent invalidation and other legal or legislative threats to a product's reimbursement status within public and private insurers' payment systems.
In Section 3, we empirically assess the asset market incidence of two distinctive realizations of within-market policy risk. Specifically, we analyze the market capitalization of Myriad Genetics, a company known primarily for its development of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 molecular diagnostic tests for breast and ovarian cancer. As detailed in Section 3, Myriad's case is noteworthy along multiple dimensions. Myriad's intellectual property was addressed by the Supreme Court, which ultimately invalidated some of its patent claims. Following the Supreme Court's decision, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) re-evaluated its reimbursements for the affected services. Further, Myriad's finances were unusually reliant on the revenues generated by the affected product lines. The validity of the disputed patent claims and the generosity of Medicare's reimbursements thus had significant implications for Myriad's future profitability. Section 3's analysis reveals that the resolution of these policy risks significantly affected Myriad's market capitalization. We estimate that the Supreme Court's invalidation of Myriad's intellectual property reduced its valuation by roughly 23 percent, or in excess of $500 million. Subsequent re-determination of Medicare's reimbursements for Myriad's tests similarly moved Myriad's market capitalization by several hundred million dollars.
We further observe that Myriad's capitalization exhibited high volatility throughout the time period in question. We conclude with a brief discussion of these policy risks' implications for aggregate levels of medical innovation, for the direction of innovative effort, and for the structure of the firms in which this innovation takes place.
II The Risks Faced by Medical Innovators
Innovators face a large number of uncertainties. This section presents a typology of the risks to which those who invest in innovation, and in particular in medical innovation, are exposed. We begin by defining three broad categories of risk. We then discuss the extent to which these risks have been analyzed in prior work and, to the extent that they have, how they have been found to affect innovative activity.
II.a A Broad Typology of Risks
In this section we succinctly define three broad categories of risk faced by medical innovators and their investors.
Pre-Market Risks: Pre-market risks encompass all risks realized prior to a product's introduction to the market. Such risks occur over the course of the development and regulatory approval processes.
Within-Market Economic Risks: Within-market economic risks encompass all standard economic threats to the demand for an innovator's product or to a firm's production costs. Such risks include the introduction of superior or lower-cost substitutes. Demand may also be affected by changes in the prevalence of the medical condition at which a given innovation is targeted.
Within-Market Policy Risks: Within-market policy risks encompass post-approval, policy-driven threats to an innovation's profitability. By nature, such risks depend on the specifics of the markets under consideration. Examples include reassessments of the validity of intellectual property claims and reassessments of a technology's efficacy and side effects. They also include changes in the generosity of public insurers' reimbursements, both in aggregate and for specific products.
II.b Implications for the Volume and Organization of Medical Innovation
Uncertainties have implications for both the volume and organization of innovative activity. When uncertainties involve disproportionately downside risks, they reduce expected returns and will thus tend to discourage innovative activity. Uncertainty has further been found to stall both investment and overall economic activity conditional upon expected returns (Bloom, 2009; Shoag and Veuger, 2015) . To the extent that the associated risks can be diversified across product lines, they may tend to increase the scale of the organizations within which innovative activity takes place. In the remainder of this section, we illustrate the uncertainties at work in the context of medical innovation and discuss the state of the evidence on their relevance.
II.b.1 Pre-Market Risks
Pre-market risks include the uncertainties of the product development and regulatory approval processes. The scientific difficulty of discovery and the stringency of regulatory approval shape medical innovation's expected returns. Because some aspects of the uncertainty they introduce can be smoothed through scale, these uncertainties can have implications for innovation's organization.
Broad descriptions of pharmaceutical development find that roughly 1 in 5,000 to 10,000 molecules investigated by basic researchers ultimately make their way to market (Lipsky and Sharp, 2001) . With expected total costs between pre-clinical and clinical development approaching $3 billion (Mullard, 2014) , it should not be surprising that pharmaceutical development has historically been concentrated among firms of substantial scale. That said, biotechnology's rise has been associated with a proliferation of smaller players (Cockburn, 2004) . While research on pre-market risks has focused primarily on the pharmaceutical sector, Stern (2014) explores the impact of regulatory uncertainty on the development of new medical devices.
Recent evidence from cancer trials shows that the expected length of the approval process shapes the direction and volume of innovative activity (Budish et al., 2013) . Because firms patent potential cancer treatments early in the approval process, the process's length reduces a firm's period of patent exclusivity. And because it is easier to demonstrate the efficacy of drugs targeted at cancers that tend to kill quickly, Budish et al. (2013) find that firms invest relatively little in the development of treatments for cancers with low rates of short-term mortality.
II.b.2 Within-Market Economic Risks
Within-market economic risks include a variety of standard, post-approval uncertainties involving a product's profitability. Such uncertainties include input cost variability, changes in the number of potential purchasers, and changes in the availability of alternatives developed by competitors. The introduction of competing products has received detailed attention in the growth literature, in particular in the context of "creative destruction" models of growth and innovation (Aghion and Howitt, 1992) . As detailed in the following paragraph, the demand-side drivers of potential market size have received significant attention in the relevant empirical literature.
Within-market economic risks are widely studied in the empirical literature, which finds that medical innovation is highly responsive to the relevant incentives. Research has found both drug and medical device innovation to exhibit significant responsiveness to the market contractions and expansions implied by shifting demographics, coverage regimes, and public health requirements. Acemoglu and Linn (2004) , for example, find that pharmaceutical research tracked the predictable changes in market size driven by the baby boom's population bulge. Clemens (2013) finds that the market expansion resulting from Medicare's introduction led to a substantial increase in U.S.-based patenting in medical equipment and devices. Finally, Finkelstein (2004) finds that changes in inoculation policy significantly altered the course of vaccine development.
II.b.3 Within-Market Policy Risks
Within-market policy risks involve legal uncertainties that influence a product's market standing. In this context, the political economy and public choice literatures focus most of their attention on regulatory capture and lobbying. That is, much research has analyzed efforts to write the rules of the game, as opposed to navigating them as they are (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998; Djankov et al., 2002) . The corporate strategy literature devotes more attention to rule navigation. This literature typically adopts the perspective of a single firm, as in Wilson and Veuger (2015) , and tends not to consider the regulatory environment's impact on an industry's organization and aggregate outcomes.
We emphasize the risks associated with intellectual property claims and public insurers' reimbursement policies. 1 Initial patent or product approval carry no guarantees of permanence. The risks of patent invalidation or revocation of product approval have straightforward implications for innovation's expected returns. Similarly, public insurers have no obligation to maintain the reimbursement rates upon which they initially settle.
These policy risks have received limited attention in the literature on medical innovation. Below, we estimate the asset market incidence of two recent realizations of such risks. The first involves the Supreme Court's invalidation of a subset of the patent claims held by Myriad Genetics, Inc. Following the invalidation of Myriad's patent claims, the federal Medicare program re-evaluated the reimbursement rates it pays for the relevant medical services. 2 Our second piece of analysis involves the asset market incidence of a major announcement in this reimbursement re-evaluation process.
Our analysis of these instances of product-specific reimbursement risk can be contrasted with the implications of recent work on aggregate medical reimbursement risk (Koijen et al., 2014) . Diversification across product lines can provide relief from idiosyncratic reimbursement risk, but not against aggregate reimbursement risk. Because aggregate reimbursement risk cannot be diversified away, it has relatively direct implications for the industry-wide risk premium and the volume of innovative activity. By contrast, 1 Product liability risk is another major type of within-market policy risk. 2 Reimbursement changes may alter the returns to innovation through effects on both prices and on the quantity demanded. In some cases, the quantity demanded is mediated by health providers' technology adoption decisions. An expanding body of research, including studies by Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) , Clemens and Gottlieb (2014), and Freedman et al. (2012) , finds that technology adoption responds to reimbursement policy in the standard direction. 6 product-specific reimbursement risks create a rationale for pooling the revenue streams associated with a diverse array of medical products. The same can be said for the risk of product-specific patent invalidation. Our analysis thus highlights risks that are of particular relevance for small-scale innovators, with implications for innovative activity's organization.
III The Relevance of Within-Market Policy Risks: Evidence from the Case of Myriad Genetics
This section presents evidence that within-market policy risks can exert significant influence over the fortunes of medical innovators and their investors. The evidence stems from events involving the intellectual property of Myriad Genetics, Inc (hereafter simply "Myriad"). Myriad provides molecular diagnostic screening and holds patents covering a variety of claims related to the services it provides. As detailed below, Myriad's revenue stream was highly exposed to the performance of a single product line. The events we analyze thus involved sufficient risk that, as shown, the resolution of the associated uncertainties significantly moved Myriad's market capitalization.
III.a Background on Myriad Genetics
Myriad, founded in 1991, is an American molecular diagnostic firm headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah, and traded publicly on the NASDAQ Global Select Market (Myriad Genetics, Inc., 2014). The firm's market capitalization has averaged $2.1 billion over the past Prospective competitors, including Ambry Genetics, submitted data to CMS implying that they could provide the relevant services at lower cost. CMS initially responded to this pric- 3 The relevant market institutions, namely those of the market for a health care service financed primarily through third-party payment, and in particular by Medicare, distinguish the pricing problem from the standard monopoly case. The payment is effectively determined through a negotiation between CMS and Myriad that is guided by Myriad's submission of cost information to CMS. CMS implicitly acknowledges that providers like Myriad require compensation for the fixed costs of research and development, enabling pricing above marginal cost. The CCMP is the NASDAQ Composite Index, which includes all NASDAQ stocks that are not, among other things, exchange-traded funds, derivatives, or preferred shares. It includes over 3,000 firms.
The ideal benchmark for our analysis would be an index including firms subject to similar aggregate shocks, and exhibiting similar volatility under "normal" market conditions, as Myriad. Because the NBI includes other firms in the biotechnology sector, it is relatively well-suited from the perspective of capturing firms that would experience aggregate shocks similar to those experienced by Myriad. We use the S&P 400 because, as an index of mid-cap firms of which Myriad is one, it may capture the degree of volatility one might expect for a firm of Myriad's size. The S&P 500 and CCMP have less to recommend them as benchmarks for Myriad per se, but provide a broader sense of the performance of equities over the analysis period. As shown below, our analysis of Myriad's relative performance depends little on the index to which we compare it.
Second, we calculate cumulative abnormal returns by applying a standard "market model" event study methodology using the same indices just discussed (MacKinlay, 1997).
With R t indicating Myriad's return and R m t indicating the return on the benchmark index at time t, we estimate R t = α + βR m t + ε t for the period from 150 through 30 days before the event, under the assumption that E[ε t ] = 0 and Var[ε t ] = σ 2 ε . The abnormal return, AR t , is then computed as the difference between the actual return, R t , and the normal return predicted by the model: AR t = R t − (α + βR m t ). The sum of these abnormal returns over select trading days is then the cumulative abnormal return.
The second difficulty we face involves the role of expectations. Abnormal returns capture changes in the expected net present value of a firm's stream of future profits relative to the market. Expectations regarding each event will, of course, be reflected in Myriad's valuation prior to the event's realization. It was known, for example, that the Supreme Court would issue a decision. It was unknown whether that decision would go "for" or "against" Myriad and to what degree. For simplicity, suppose the decision was binary and that it was, at time t, expected to go against Myriad with probability p. Letting π t denote Myriad's expected profit in period t and δ the relevant discount factor, we write the decision's impact on Myriad's profitability as:
The change in market capitalization thus captures
which is the decision's total incidence scaled by 1-p.
The total incidence of the events we study could thus be recovered given knowledge of the relevant probabilities. As we do not have such knowledge, we are only able to estimate suggestive bounds. Importantly, the estimates will in no case overstate an event's total impact on Myriad's expected profit stream. Commentary surrounding the timing of the Supreme Court decision suggests a significant division of views regarding the extent to which the court's ruling would invalidate Myriad's intellectual property. By contrast, CMS's April 1st increase in the reimbursement rates applicable to BRACAnalysis was largely unexpected. The abnormal returns to the latter event may thus come close to approximating the CMS decision's total incidence. The abnormal returns to the former event may represent closer to half of the Supreme Court ruling's total incidence. Second, while volatility has been the rule rather than the exception, the Supreme Court decision and announcement of Medicare's reimbursement decision emerge as noteworthy events within the history. The analyses presented in Figure 2 , Figure 3 , and Table 1 further elaborate on the impact of these events. 
III.c An Initial Look At Myriad's Returns Relative to the Market

III.d Event 1: The Effect of Patent Invalidation on Myriad's Stock Price
In Table 1 , we analyze abnormal returns constructed using the "market model" approach from the finance literature.
indices. The bulk of the price changes over this time period ranged from -5 to 5%. shorter windows surrounding the Supreme Court's decision. These include the day of the event (from closing the day before to closing the day of), the four day period starting at close before the event, and the four day period that commences at close three days before the event. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using the standard "market model"
and are again presented relative to each of the four comparison indices described above.
Below each estimate of the relevant abnormal return, we present t-statistics implied by 
III.f Implications of the Magnitudes of Myriad's Changes in Market Capitalization
We conclude this section by considering the economic magnitudes of the observed changes in Myriad's market capitalization. Both the Supreme Court decision and the reimbursement re-determination altered Myriad's market capitalization by around $500 million. 6
lines.
The precise nature of the information transmitted by these decisions is, of course, difficult to determine. It is unclear, for example, with what probability investors expected the Supreme Court's decision to go against Myriad, and to go against it to the degree that it did. Consequently, $500 million is a lower bound on investors' initial assessments of the decision's full economic impact.
We now turn to Medicare's reimbursement re-determination. In the fiscal year ending June 30th, 2014, Myriad generated $520 million in revenue from its BRACAnalysis product line. Were these services reimbursed at $1,438 rather than $2,184, the resulting revenue would have been $340 million. The differential, assuming application of Medicare's rate for all services, thus amounts to $180 million per year. The increase in Myriad's market capitalization is nearly three times this amount.
Medicare accounts for a modest share of Myriad's BRACAnalysis revenues. Over the period in question, analysts put Medicare's share at 10 percent (Britt, 2013 (Britt, 2013) . While the magnitude of Medicare's influence on private insurers' payment rates need not necessarily be large, recent work has found it to be substantial (Clemens and Gottlieb, 2013) . In the present case, private payment spillovers appear to have significantly amplified the effects of Medicare's payment change. Such spillovers can thus augment the risks inherent in public insurers' reimbursement policies.
IV Discussion and Conclusion
Past theoretical research has shown how uncertainty about the broader environment in which firms operate can affect their behavior (Rodrik, 1991; Hassett and Metcalf, 1999) .
In this paper, we provide evidence on the relevance of policy risks for this kind of decisionmaking. There are theoretical grounds for expecting these micro factors to have aggregate implications (Friedman, 1968; Bernanke, 1983) , and recent empirical evidence appears to support these theories' relevance (Bloom, 2009; Shoag and Veuger, 2015) . Because the institutional uncertainties we analyze are primarily downside risks, they depress expected returns and may thus reduce aggregate levels of technology development (Scherer, 2001; Grabowski, 2004; Cockburn and Stern, 2010) . On the other hand, there is evidence that privately held intellectual property sometimes reduces innovation by other parties (e.g., Williams, 2013) . These competing forces imply that increasing the strength of intellectual property rights may either increase or decrease innovative activity.
Whether one thinks medical innovation is sub-optimally slow (Murphy and Topel, 2003) , or worries about its costs (Weisbrod, 1991) , its responsiveness to incentives highlights the surrounding policy environment's importance. σ 2 εi , where R mt is the return of a given market index. The abnormal return, AR it , is then computed as the difference between the actual return, A it , and the normal return predicted by the model: AR it = A it − (α i + β i R mt ). The sum of these abnormal returns over select trading days is then the cumulative abnormal return. Abnormal returns are given relative to four benchmark indices (the S&P 500 Index, the NBI Index, the CCMP Index, and the S&P 400 Index). The estimation window runs from 150 to 30 trading days before the event. T-statistics appear in parentheses beneath each point estimate. The Data is from Bloomberg.
A Appendix
This appendix provides further information regarding important legal and business events in the recent history of Myriad Genetics, Inc. The event listings serve two purposes. First, they further flesh out the context within which our asset market analyses take place.
Second, in some instances they characterize Myriad's responses to the business and legal environment it faced.
I.a Supreme Court Time Line
The list below summarizes major events in the case Association for Molecular Pathology 
I.c Post Supreme Court Legal Action
Following the Supreme Court's decision, a series of further legal actions were taken by both Myriad and its competitors (Myriad Genetics, Inc., 2014) . These legal actions support two conclusions regarding the intellectual property uncertainties associated with new
